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Abstract
This paper extends a standard altruism model of private transfers to a multiple goods model.
It has been pointed out that unlike the exchange-motivated transfers, altruistically motivated
private transfers would mitigate income inequality in terms of quantity. However, taking the
effect of multiple goods into account, it is shown that inequality-increasing transfers with
purely altruistic motives can be apparently observed when market exchange is not available.
This paper also introduces some concrete examples from the cases in a post-Soviet State.
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Private income transfers are important for reallocating resources, particularly in
developing countries. Private transfers often represent a signiﬁcant fraction of
the overall income of poor households and are likely to be essential in their daily
struggles to make ends meet (e.g., Morduch 1999, Cox and Jimenez 1990, Raval-
lion and Dearden 1988).
Two motives for private transfers have been examined in the literature: altru-
ism and self-interested exchange. The standard altruism model of private transfers
makes a strong prediction about the signs and relative magnitudes of the eﬀects of
recipients’ and donors’ incomes on transfer amounts (e.g., Cox 1987, Cox, Eser,
and Jimenez 1998; for details, see section 2 of this paper). Both the altruism and
exchange hypotheses predict that the probability of transfer receipt is inversely
related to the pre-transfer income. However, the two hypotheses contradict each
other in predicting the marginal eﬀects of the pre-transfer income on the transfer
amounts. According to the altruism model, as the recipients’ income increases,
they would receive smaller amounts of transfers, whereas the exchange hypothesis
states that transfers need not necessarily decline (Cox 1987).
This prediction of the altruism model has been well tested in a vast number of
studies. For instance, in the U.S. (Cox 1987), Indonesia (Ravallion and Dearden
1988), thePhilippines(CoxandJimenez1995), orRussia(Cox, Eser, andJimenez
1995), the marginal eﬀects of pre-transfer income on transfer amounts have been
found to be negative. These results accord with the altruism model and conﬁrm
that private transfers mitigate income disparities. On the other hand, many evi-
dences are inconsistent with the altruism hypothesis (e.g., Lucas and Stark 1985
for Botswana; Cox, Eser, Jimenez, and Jordan 1995 for Cote D’lvore; Cox, Eser,
and Jimenez 1998 for Peru; Cox, Jimenez, and Jordan 1998 for Kyrgyzstan). Ac-
cording to the basic altruism model, these results against the hypothesis can be
regarded as evidence that self-interested exchange motives are dominant in the
transfers in these countries.
However, this paper suggests that taking the eﬀects of multiple goods into
account, it is possible that inequality-increasing transfers with purely altruistic
motives could arise. In actuality, private transfers involve various types of goods,
such as cash, foods items, textiles, durable goods, livestock, stocks, and bonds.
However, the eﬀects of such variety in private transfers have received little at-
tention in the literature, whereas the market price of a total private transfer was
usually utilized in the analyses. The assumption that each good involved in trans-
fers can be converted into its cash equivalent with no barriers to exchange appears
to be unrealistic, particularly in developing countries or post-Soviet states, where
market institutions are insuﬃcient and informal systems of barters for commod-
ity goods or services play an active part in daily life. Considering the relevant
1backgrounds of the multi-good model, this paper introduces additional concrete
examples from the cases in a post-Soviet state in section 4.
The main purpose of this paper is to extend the basic altruism model to a
model of multiple goods transfers and to show that it is possible for a positive
relationship to exist between the amount of the recipient’s resource i and that of
transfer i recieved when market exchange is not available. This simple conclusion
contains rich implications not only in theoretical or empirical terms but also for
policy discussion in that it also indicates that the public subsidies to the poor will
not always crowd out but will cause private transfers in a certain condition, as will
be derived from the model.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 extracts the ba-
sic altruism model. Section 3 presents the multi-good model of altruistic private
transfers. Section 4 describes some focused examples to explain the multi-good
model, and section 5 provides some concluding remarks. Some calculations are
provided in the Appendix.
2. A Basic Altruism Model of Private Transfers
In the standard altruism model (e.g., Cox 1987, Cox, Eser and Jimenez 1998),
donors (say, parents) care about the well-being of recipients (children); they re-
ceive utility from their own consumption and from the utility of their recipients.
The utility function of a donor is thus as follows.
U = U(cp,V(ck)), (1)
where U denotes the donor’s utility, cp the donor’s consumption, V the recipient’s
utility, and ck the recipient’s consumption. This is a single period model, and
there is no saving. Thus, cp = Ip − T and ck = Ik + T, where T denotes the net
amount of private transfers from the donor to the recipient, Ip the donor’s income






, is assumed to be positive; that is why this is called the altruism model.
ThedonorchoosesT tomaximizehisutility. Then, transfersareusedtoequatethe
donor’s marginal utility of consumption, Uc, with the recipient’s marginal utility
of consumption from the parent’s perspective, UVVc. The comparative statics of













2First, a change in transfers with an increase in the recipient’s income is negative,
while that with an increase in the donor’s income is positive. This result indicates
that altruistic private transfers will always be averse to inequality. Second, if
transfers are positive, an increase of one dollar in the recipient’s income along
with a decrease of one dollar in the donor’s income will result in the decrease
of one dollar in the transfer to the recipient. This result suggests that a public
income-redistribution and private transfers will crowd out each other. This eﬀect
of crowding out has been the main cause of policy concern over private transfers
(for details, see Cox and Jakubson 1995).
3. A Multi-Good Model of Altruistic Priavate Transfers
For simplicity, let us assume that two types of private transfers (good 1 vs. good
2) ﬂow from a donor to a recipient, and each of them has a certain amount of each
resource at the beginning and consumes each good in the single period model.
Then, the utility of the donor is given by
U = U(cp1,cp2,V(ck1,ck2)), (4)
where c indexes consumption, p indexes the donor, k indexes the recipient, and 1
and 2 index two types of goods. We assume that there is a barrier to the market
exchange and both the donor and recipient cannot exchange goods outside private
transfers. In such economy, the donor’s consumptions will equal the resources
plus the transfers, and the recipient’s consumptions will equal the resources minus
thetransfers. Thus, cp1 = Rp1−T1, cp2 = Rp2−T2, ck1 = Rk1+T1, andck2 = Rk2+T2,
where T1 and T2 are the transfer amounts 1. The donor chooses T1 and T2 to
maximize his utility in this model; that is, they solve
MaxU = U(Rp1 − T1,Rp2 − T2,V(Rk1 + T1,Rk2 + T2)), (5)
s.t.T1 ≥ 0,T2 ≥ 0,Rp1 − T1 ≥ 0,Rp2 − T2 ≥ 0,Rk1 + T1 ≥ 0,Rk2 + T2 ≥ 0.













The signs of all the above expressions are ambiguous. In particular, the results
related to the recipient’s resource predict that unlike the basic altruism model,
1In case we assume that there is no barriers to exchange of two goods with ﬁxed prices, the
model will be equivalent to a single-good case by using so-called Hicks’ composite commodity
theorem which states that any group of commodities whose relative prices remain unchanged can
be treated as a single commodity (Hicks 1946, 312).
3the transfers of the goods i need not necessarily decline with the increase in the
recipient’s resource of the goods i. This is because in this two-good model, an
exogenous increase in Rki gives rise to two kinds of eﬀects on Ti: the direct (neg-







is a donor’s subjective value of good 1 relative to that of good 2. Thus, the curve







recipient’s subjective value of good 1 relative to that of good 2. Thus, the curve
D can be regarded as the recipient’s demand curve of T1. The optimum amount
of T1 is chosen at an intersection, E. In the ﬁrst place, an increase in Rk1 causes
a decrease in the recipient’s marginal utility of the good 1’s consumption. This
eﬀect causes the demand curve of T1 to shift downward and to the left, which will
make E shift to E’and the amount of T1 to decrease. In the multi-good model,
however, we must note that an increase in Rk1 also causes an increase in the re-
cipient’s marginal utility of the good 2’s consumption. This eﬀect can make the
recipient’s demand of T2 to rise and the amount of T2 to increase. If the eﬀect of
the increase in T2 is suﬃciently strong, subsequently, the donor’s marginal utility
of good 1 will fall and recipient’s marginal utility of good 1 will rise. As a result,
the supply curve of T1 will shift downward and to the right, and the demand curve
upward and to the right. Then, it is possible that the optimum point E” can exceed
E horizontally, implying that
∂T1
∂Rk1 can have a positive sign.
To see the condition under which the sign of the expression is determined,
consider the case in which the donor and recipient have constant elasticity of sub-
stitution (CES):
U = [αCp1
−p + (1 − α)Cp2
−p]
−1/p + δ[βCk1
−q + (1 − β)Ck2
−q]
−1/q, (7)
where their elasticities of substitution are σ = 1
p+1 and ϵ = 1
q+1, respectively. In







































∂Rki will have a positive sign, when we deal with goods for which the ratio
of the donor’s optimum consumption is lower than that of recipient’s. In this case,
the cross eﬀect through the other goods’ transfer must be suﬃciently strong to
overcome the direct eﬀect on the transfer of the original goods.
If σ = ϵ, this condition will become simple by using the condition Uc1/Uc2 =
























< 0, if α > β.







where i = 1,2,i , j. This expression suggests that an increase of one unit in the
recipient’s resource i coupled with the decrease of one unit in the donor’s resource
i, will result in the decrease of one unit in the transfer i. It follows that in this
model, private transfers of good i will ultimately be neutralized by the eﬀect of
the exogenous redistribution of good i. However, in this multi-good model of the
constant elasticity, this prediction can hold under the condition where the signs of
the two derivatives on the left of the expression are the same, although in the basic
altruism model, ∂T
∂Ik < 0 and ∂T
∂Ip > 0 necessarily hold. Thus, in this multi-good
model, one of two public policies subsidies to the poor or taxes to the rich will
increase private transfers, whereas the other will decrease them.
4. Examples for the Multi-Good Model of Altruistic Private Transfers
This section provides some relevant examples to explain the background condi-
tions of the multi-good model and considers their implications by introducing the
actual cases in Uzbekistan, a post-Soviet country where the author has conducted
the ﬁeld research for several years 2.
(a) In the regions of the Ferghana valley in this country, which is famous for being
a major producer of cotton, the byproduct materials from cotton reﬁnement, such
as kunjara (oilcake) or shulha (cottonseed meal) have been widely utilized not
only as fuel but also as animal feed mainly for cattle. In the socialist era, it was a
widespread practice for livestock-breeding households in these regions, who had
to feed their cattle through the winter season, to receive kunjara or shulha with-
out any payment from acquaintances who have access to these goods, rather than
to purchase them in the bazaars 3. In most cases, the workers or the guardsmen
in cotton warehouses or cotton-oil extraction factories, who had greater access to
2A detailed discussion of the private economy and traditions in Uzbekistan is available in my
PhD dissertation (Hiwatari 2006).
3As has been pointed out in the literature, limited access to the scarce goods and services in
the former U.S.S.R. had led to the mobilization of a range of informal mechanisms that have been
5these goods, would voluntarily hand them over to their relatives or neighbors.
These voluntary transfers of kunjara or shulha, however, would not be neces-
sarilydistributedtohouseholdswithfewerresources; recipienthouseholdsusually
had a certain amount of resources, such as cattle or at least adequate space to store
feed. In this respect, these transfers had a tendency to increase the inequality, but
do they indeed constitute an evidence for their non-altruistic motives? In light
of the foregoing considerations, the livestock owned by the households appears
to induce voluntary transfers of animal feed to them, since this type of transfers
of complementary goods could more eﬀectively augment the altruistically formed
utility. In this case, the livestock should be considered as good 1 and the feedstuﬀ
as good 2 in ﬁg.1. Moreover, according to the multi-good model, if the increase in
feedstuﬀ transfers is suﬃciently strong, it will subsequently lead to the transfers
of livestock as well. Although the last point lacks strong proof, it may be likely
that the households who could once establish a steady access to feedstuﬀ tended
to receive more gifts in the form of livestock.
From the viewpoint of policy implications, this example suggests that pub-
lic subsidy in the form of livestock could be complementary to private transfers
and could increase voluntary transfers of kunjara or shulha, while a subsidy in
the form of feedstuﬀ might crowd out these voluntary transfers 4. In reality, it is
often observed that the councils of the neighborhood communities (mahallas) in
these areas provide cattle to the poor households free of cost as a form of social
assistance, even at present; this may perhaps vitalize voluntary transfers of animal
feed 5.
(b) In the second example, construction materials are considered as good 1, and
labor forces as good 2. In Uzbekistan, there has been a well-known traditional
concept of mutual assistance known as “khashar”, which refers to a voluntary aid
in the form of labor (Arifkhanova 2000, 13). Since the participation in khashar
called the “second,” “parallel,” or “unoﬃcial,” economy (e.g., Grossman 1997, Lubin 1984). In
Uzbekistan, for example, private subsidiary agriculture, farming activities, or barters of privately
produced goods were so widespread that these private activities would satisfy the primary needs
of the rural population for vegetables or animal products (e.g., Lubin 1984, 182). In cotton-
growing regions in particular, the majority of the population, who would in fact work in the public
production system for only a part of the year, such as in cotton-picking, tended to devote more
time to private subsidiary activities, such as petty commodity production or livestock-breeding on
their private plots (e.g., Poliakov 1982, 44).
4As shown in the multi-good model, the relative consumption ratio determines which good in-
creases private transfers. Additional focused observation and empirical tests regarding this aspect
remain to be examined.
5For instance, in 2006, the council of the neighborhood community (mahalla) researched by
the author, which had a size of 500 households, located in the Andijan region, decided to provide
cattle to each of the 18 poor households.
6has been regarded as a good deed (sovob ish), indigenous Uzbek people have ac-
tively cooperated in the name of khashar in accomplishing various kinds of con-
struction work, such as building teahouses (chaikhona), repairing mosques, and
digging and cleaning irrigation canals. The typical khashar can be observed when
privately owned houses are constructed in the traditional communities. In most
cases, the owners of the new houses collect necessary construction materials and
then invite as many neighbors and relatives as possible, who get together two or
three times for a construction work (Arifkhanova 2000, 13).
With regard to the custom of khashar, the benevolent aspects, such as help-
ing the poor, have often been emphasized. However, it does not imply that it is
always targeted toward poorer households. Instead, it does have a latent possibil-
ity that the poor, who could not even prepare for the construction materials, could
ﬁnd less opportunities to announce and organize khashar. This can explain that a
greater amount of construction materials (good 1) lead to a greater ﬂow of volun-
tary labor (good 2). Considering that once the khashar begins, they are likely to
ﬁnd more opportunities to receive assistance from participants for prividing ma-
terials that run short in the construction process, it will be possible that even the
inequality-increasing transfer of a speciﬁc good (good 1) could occur, as predicted
by the model.
In this case, the policy implication would be that merely providing construc-
tion materials as a form of social assistance might be a complementary policy and
encourage more voluntary labor, rather than trying to mobilize residents’ labor
forces arbitrarily 6.
5. Concluding Remarks
It has been pointed out that altruistically motivated private transfers would mit-
igate income inequality in terms of quantity. However, we found that a positive
relationship could exist between the amount of recipient’s resource i and that of
transfer i even if the motive for the transfer is purely altruistic, when the market
exchange of transfer goods is diﬃcult. This implication is remarkable considering
that private transfers are particularly signiﬁcant as an important source of income
in developing countries. Focusing on this ﬁnding might be helpful for empirical
implications and policy consideration in such areas.
6In the recent eﬀorts toward community development in Central Asia, which has been pro-
moted by Western donors, one of major topics concerned how local traditions such as khashar
could be incorporated into community development projects (e.g., Earle 2005). However, the
mobilization of residents for their projects by utilizing traditional systems has turned out to be
unexpectedly diﬃcult (e.g., Earle 2005, Stevens 2005). The viewpoint from the multi-good model



































= −Uc2 + UVVc2 = 0,































A = Uc1c1 + UVVc1c1 < 0, B = Uc1c2 + UVVc1c2 > 0,
C = Uc1c2 + UVVc1c2 > 0, D = Uc2c2 + UVVc2c2 < 0,
E = Uc1c1dRp1 − UVVc1c1dRk1 + Uc1c2dRp2 − UVVc1c2dRk2,
F = Uc1c2dRp1 − UVVc1c2dRk1 + Uc2c2dRp2 − UVVc2c2dRk2,
The second order conditions correspond to A < 0, D < 0 and the Jacobian deter-
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